China's Ministry of Public Security says it has put 63 people under criminal compulsory measures over Silver Fox, a Chinese-language malware operation that stole from Chinese firms. No charges, trials or sentences have been reported. Part 2 of the Hackers vs the state series asks whether Beijing is punishing the crime or the victim list.
The VasyGrek case fits a pattern in which the line Russia draws around cybercrime runs through the victim, not the crime. A rare arrest of a group that hit Russian firms shows where tolerance may end, and how little the public record says about why the state acted now.
Palantir says the Pentagon replaced Claude inside Maven with no operational impact. The claim highlights a different dependency: the platform connecting models to military data and workflows.
ShinyHunters says it hacked the FBI's recruitment systems in retaliation for a public warning, and wants the warning withdrawn. The group is still best described as criminal. What that word cannot capture is how much a loose, arrest-resistant network can now do to a state institution.
Washington spent years blocking Nvidia's best AI chips from China. It is now licensing selected Chinese buyers for the H200 — not the end of export controls, but a different idea of what they're for.
A humanoid robot ran the 100m faster than Usain Bolt in Beijing. The unratified time matters less than the slope of the curve behind it.
The US has formally approved the export of up to 35,000 advanced Nvidia chips to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, testing where the chip curtain actually ends.
Putin has ordered a national task force, since formalised by decree into a presidential commission, to coordinate Russia's generative AI push, framing reliance on foreign models as a security risk.
Beijing is weighing export controls that would restrict foreign downloads of Chinese AI model weights, reversing its openness strategy.
The FIFA World Cup was a great showcase for Africa
The Netherlands and China say the Nexperia dispute is behind them, but the chipmaker itself remains split into rival national halves.
Finnish commandos boarded the cargo vessel Fitburg over a suspected Baltic cable cut, but recent history suggests prosecution is the hard part.
By converting its CHIPS Act grants into an Intel stake, the US government has crossed from subsidizing the chip industry to owning a piece of it.
New US guidance extends licensing rules for advanced AI chips to any company with a Chinese parent, wherever it happens to sit.
Brussels is moving to delay and soften parts of the AI Act it spent years selling as the global standard, before the hard rules even bite.
Chips, models and cloud capacity are no longer ordinary exports but instruments of statecraft—granted to allies, withheld from rivals, traded for investment and alignment. Three developments in recent weeks suggest the transactional era has arrived; the harder question is how long such leverage survives being used.
In six months India bought record Russian oil, signed a landmark trade deal with Europe, thawed with China, and quietly defied Washington. Is multi-alignment a strategy — or a stress position?